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Eleven Theses on Socialist Revolution
Abstract
It is an open question whether socialism will ever exist on a national or international scale. But if it will, it
will come about in ways different from what both Marxists and anarchists have traditionally thought. In
this article I present eleven "theses" regarding how it might be possible for the world to achieve an
economically democratic civilization in an era of unprecedented crisis. In the process, I try to explain what
has gone wrong with attempted socialist revolutions in the past.
This is reprinted with permission. The article originally appeared in Counterpunch, August 27, 2021.
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Editors Note: Originally published in Counterpunch on August 27, 2021.
How should we think about “socialist revolution” in the twenty-first century? I put the term in
scare-quotes because it can be hard to believe anymore that a socialist, or economically
democratic, civilization is even possible—much less inevitable, as Marx and Engels seem to
have believed. Far from being on the verge of achieving something like socialism, humanity
appears to be on the verge of consuming itself in the dual conflagrations of environmental
collapse and, someday perhaps, nuclear war. The collective task of survival seems challenging
enough; the task of overcoming capitalist exploitation and instituting a politico-economic regime
of cooperation, community, and democracy appears completely hopeless, given the
overwhelming crises and bleak horizons of the present.
Some leftists might reply that it is precisely only by achieving socialism that civilization can
save itself from multidimensional collapse. This belief may be true, but if so, the prospects for a
decent future have not improved, because the timeline for abolishing capitalism and the timeline
by which we must “solve” global warming and ecological collapse do not remotely correspond.
There is no prospect for a national, international, or global transition to socialism within the next
several decades, decades that are pivotal for addressing ecological crises. In the United States,
for example, it took Republican reactionaries almost a century of organizing starting in the
1940s to achieve the power they have now, and this was in a political economy in which they
already had considerable power. It isn’t very likely that socialists, hardly a powerful group, will
be able to overthrow capitalism on a shorter timeline. If anything, the international process of
“revolution” will take much longer. Perhaps not as long as the transition from feudalism to
capitalism, but certainly over a century.
It can seem, then, naïve and utopian even to consider the prospects for socialism when we’re
confronted with the more urgent and immediate task of sheer survival. However guilty capitalism
is of imposing on humanity its current predicament, the fact is that we can make progress in
addressing the environmental crisis even in the framework of capitalism, for example by
accelerating the rollout of renewable and nuclear energy, dismantling the fossil fuel industry,
regulating pesticides that are contributing to the decimation of insect populations, experimenting
with geoengineering, and so on. These goals—and their corollaries, such as defeating centrist
and conservative candidates for political office—should be the most urgent priority of left-wing
activists for the foreseeable future. If organized human life comes to an end, nothing else matters
much.
Nevertheless, we shouldn’t just forget about socialism for now, because it remains a distant goal,
a fundamental value, and organizing for it—e.g., “raising the consciousness” of the working
class—can improve lives in the short term as well. So it is incumbent on us to think about how
we might achieve the distant goal, what strategies promise to be effective, what has gone wrong
in the past, and what revisions to Marxist theory are necessary to make sense of past failures. We
shouldn’t remain beholden to old slogans and formulations that were the product of very
different circumstances than prevail today; we should be willing to rethink revolution from the
ground up, so to speak.

I have addressed these matters in a book called Worker Cooperatives and Revolution, and more
concisely in various articles and blog posts. Here, I’ll simply present an abbreviated series of
“theses” (eleven of them, in honor of Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach) on the subject of revolution
that strike me as commonsensical, however heterodox some of them may seem. Their cumulative
point is to reorient the Marxian conception of socialist revolution from that of a completely
ruptural seizure and overthrow of capitalist states—whether grounded in electoral or
insurrectionary measures—followed by a planned and unitary reconstruction of society (the
“dictatorship of the proletariat”), to that of a very gradual process of economic and political
transformation over many generations, in which the character of the economy changes together
with that of the state. The long transition is not peaceful or smooth or blandly “reformist.” It is
necessarily riven at all points by violent, quasi-insurrectionary clashes between the working class
and the ruling class, between international popular movements seeking to carve out a new
society and a capitalist elite seeking to prolong the current one. Given the accumulating popular
pressure on a global scale, which among other things will succeed in electing ever more
socialists to office, the capitalist state will, in spite of itself, participate to some extent in the
construction of new economic relations that is the foundation of constructing a new society—
even as the state in other respects continues to violently repress dissenting movements.
But the process of building a new economy will not be exclusively statist (despite the statism of
mainstream Marxism going back to Marx himself). Transitions between modes of production
take place on more than one plane and are not only “top-down.” In particular, as civilization
descends deeper into crisis and government proves inadequate to the task of maintaining social
order, the “solidarity economy,” supported by the state, will grow in prominence and
functionality. A world of multiform catastrophe will see alternative economic arrangements
spring up at all levels, and the strategies of “statist Marxism” will complement, or be
complemented by, the “mutual aid” (cooperative, frequently small-scale, semi-interstitial)
strategies of anarchism. These two broad traditions of the left, so often at each other’s throats,
will finally, in effect, come together to build up a new society in the midst of a collapsing ancien
régime. Crisis will, as always, provide opportunity.
1
Successful socialist revolution, meaning the creation of a society that eliminates differential
ownership and control of economic resources and instead permits democratic popular control of
the economy, has happened nowhere on a large scale or a “permanent” (“post-capitalist”) basis.
Whether in Russia, China, Cuba, or elsewhere, the dream of socialism—still less of
communism—has never been realized. According to Marxism, indeed, the very fact that these
were isolated islands under siege by a capitalist world indicates that they signified something
other than socialism, which is, naturally enough, supposed to follow capitalism and exist first and
foremost in the “advanced” countries. The fact that these “socialist” experiments ultimately
succumbed to capitalism is enough to show that, whatever progress they entailed for their
respective populations, they were in some sense, in the long term, revolutionary abortions.
2
Marx was right that there is a kind of “logic” to historical development. Notwithstanding the
postmodernist and empiricist shibboleths of contemporary historiography, history isn’t all
contingency, particularity, individual agency, and alternative paths that were tragically not taken

(because of poor leadership or whatever). Rather, institutional contexts determine that some
things are possible or probable and others impossible. Revolutionary voluntarism, the elevation
of political will above the painfully protracted, largely “unconscious” dialectical processes of
resolution of structural contradictions and subsequent appearance of new, unforeseen conditions
that are themselves “resolved” through the ordinary actions of millions of people, is a false (and
un-Marxist) theory of social change. If the world didn’t go socialist in the twentieth century, it’s
because it couldn’t have: structurally, in the heyday of corporate capitalism (monopoly
capitalism, state capitalism, imperialism, whatever one calls it), socialism was impossible.
In short, on the broadest of historical scales, the “hidden meaning” of the past—to use a phrase
beloved by Marx—is revealed by the present and future, as probabilities with which the past was
pregnant become realities.
3
Marx therefore got the timeline of revolution radically wrong. He did not (and could not) foresee
the power of nationalism, the welfare state, Keynesian stimulation of demand, the state’s
stabilizing management of the crisis-prone economy, and the like. In fact, we might say that,
falling victim to the characteristic over-optimism of Enlightenment thinkers, he mistook the birth
pangs of industrial capitalism for its death throes. Only in the neoliberal era has the capitalist
mode of production even finished its conquest of the world—which the “dialectical” logic of
historical materialism suggests is a necessary precondition for socialism—displacing remaining
peasantries from the land and privatizing “state-socialist” economies and state-owned resources.
Given the distribution of power during and after the 1970s between the working class and the
business class, together with the increasing mobility of capital (a function of the advancing
productive forces, thus predictable from historical materialism), neoliberal assaults on postwar
working-class gains were, in retrospect, entirely predictable.
4
Despite, or because of, its horrifying destructiveness, neoliberalism potentially can play the role
of opening up long-term revolutionary possibilities (even as it presents fascist possibilities as
well). Its function of exacerbating class polarization, immiserating the working class, eroding
social democracy, ripping up the social fabric, degrading the natural environment, destabilizing
the global economy, relatively homogenizing conditions between countries, hollowing out the
corporatist nation-state and compromising the integrity of the very (anti-revolutionary) idea of
“nationality,” facilitating a global consciousness through electronic media—a consciousness, in
the end, of suffering and oppression—and attenuating the middle class (historically a pretty
reliable bastion of conservatism): all this in the aggregate serves to stimulate mass protest on a
scale that, eventually, the state will find unmanageable.
Fascist repression, it’s true, is very useful, but fascist regimes can hardly remain in power
indefinitely in every country. Even just in the U.S., the governmental structure is too vast and
federated, and civil society too thick and resilient, for genuine fascism ever to be fully
consolidated everywhere, much less made permanent. Repression alone is not a viable solution
for the ruling class.

5
Sooner or later, it will be found necessary to make substantive concessions to the masses (while
never abandoning repression). Some writers argue that what these will amount to is a
revitalization and expansion of social democracy, such a sustained expansion (under the pressure
of popular movements) that eventually society will pass from social democracy straight into
socialism. This argument, however, runs contrary to the spirit of Marxism, according to which
society does not return to previous social formations after they have departed the stage of history.
Fully fledged social democracy was appropriate to a time of industrial unionism and limited
mobility of capital; it is hard to imagine that an era of unprecedented crisis and decaying nationstates will see humanity resuscitate, globally, a rather “stable” and nationalistic social form, even
expanding it relative to its capacity when unions were incomparably stronger than today. While
social democratic policies will surely persist and continue to be legislated, the intensifying
dysfunction of the nation-state (a social form that is just as transient as others) will necessitate
the granting of different kinds of concessions than centralized and expansive social democratic
ones.
6
Here, we have to shift for a moment to considering the Marxist theory of revolution. Then we’ll
see the significance of the concessions that states will likely be compelled to grant. There is a
glaring flaw in Marx’s conceptualization (expressed, for example, in the famous Preface to A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy) according to which “an era of social
revolution” begins when the dominant mode of production starts to fetter the use and
development of the productive forces. The flaw is simply that the notion of “fettering” is semimeaningless. Philosophers such as G. A. Cohen have grappled with this concept of fettering, but
we don’t have to delve into the niceties of analytic philosophy in order to understand that the
capitalist mode of production has always both fettered and developed the productive forces—
fettered them in the context, for instance, of devastating depressions, disincentives to invest in
public goods, artificial obstacles (like intellectual copyright laws) to the diffusion of knowledge,
and, in general, a socially irrational distribution of resources; even as in other respects it
still develops the productive forces, as with advances in information technology, biotechnology,
renewable energy, and so on. In order to be truly meaningful, therefore, this concept of fettering
needs revision.

7
The necessary revision is simple: we have to adopt a relative notion of fettering. Rather than an
absolute conflict, or a contradiction, between productive forces and production relations, there is
a conflict between two sets of production relations, one of which uses productive forces in a
more socially rational and “un-fettering” way than the other. This revision makes the idea of
fettering meaningful, even concretely observable. Capitalism, for example, was, in the final
analysis, able to triumph over feudalism because it was infinitely better at developing productive
forces, such that its agents could accumulate far greater resources (economic, scientific,
technological, intellectual, cultural) than the agents of feudalism. The epoch of social revolution,
properly speaking, lasted half a millennium, though it was punctuated by dramatic moments of
condensed social and political revolution such as the French Revolution.

If the idea of fettering is to apply to a transition between capitalism and socialism, it can be made
sense of only through a similar “relative” understanding, according to which a cooperative and
democratic mode of production emerges over a prolonged period of time (hopefully not half a
millennium) both interstitially and more visibly in the mainstream. As the old anarchic economy
succumbs to crisis and stagnation, the emergent “democratic” economy—which does not yet
exist today—does a better job of rationally and equitably distributing resources, thereby
attracting ever more people to its practices and ideologies. It accumulates greater resources as the
old economy continues to demonstrate its appalling injustice and dysfunction.
8
This theoretical framework permits an answer to the old question that has bedeviled so many
radicals: why have all attempts at socialist revolution failed? The answer is that they happened in
conditions that guaranteed their eventual failure. There was a radical difference between, for
example, October 1917 and the French Revolution: in the latter case, capitalist relations and
ideologies had already spread over Western Europe and acquired enormous power and
legitimacy. The French revolutionaries were beneficiaries of centuries of capitalist evolution—
not, indeed, industrial capitalist, but mercantile, agrarian, financial, and petty-bourgeois. This
long economic, social, cultural, and political evolution prepared the ground for the victories of
1789–1793. In 1917, on the other hand, there was no socialist economy whatsoever on which to
erect a political superstructure (a superstructure that, in turn, would facilitate the further and
more unobstructed development of the socialist economy).
Even industrial capitalism was barely implanted in Russia, much less socialism. The meaning of
1917 was merely that a group of opportunistic political adventurers led by two near-geniuses
(Lenin and Trotsky) took advantage of a desperate wartime situation and the desperation of the
populace—much of which, as a result, supported these “adventurers”—to seize power and
almost immediately suppress whatever limited democracy existed. The authoritarian,
bureaucratic, and brutal regime that, partly in the context of civil war, resulted—and that
ultimately led to Stalinism—was about as far from socialism as one can imagine.
It is one of the ironies of the twentieth century that the Bolsheviks both forgot and illustrate a
central Marxian dictum: never trust the self-interpretations of historical actors. There is always
an objective context and an objective, hidden historical meaning behind the actions of people
like Robespierre, Napoleon, or Lenin, a meaning they have no access to because they are caught
up in the whirl of events (and, to quote Hegel, the owl of Minerva flies only at dusk, after the
events). The fact that Lenin and his comrades were convinced they were establishing socialism is
of no more than psychological interest. It is unfortunate that many Marxists today continue to
credulously believe them.
9
Said differently, the twentieth-century strategy of “Marxist” revolutionaries to seize the state
(whether electorally or in an insurrection) and then carry out a social revolution—by means of a
sweeping, “totalizing” political will—is highly un-Marxist. It is idealistic, voluntaristic, and
unrealistic: history moves forward slowly, dialectically, “behind the backs” of historical actors,
not straightforwardly or transparently through the all-conquering will of a few leaders or a single
political party. The basic problem is that if you try to reconstruct society entirely from the top

down, you have to contend with all the institutional legacies of capitalism. Relations of coercion
and domination condition everything you do, and there is no way to break free of them by means
of political or bureaucratic will. While the right state policies can be of enormous help in
constructing an economically democratic society, in order for it to be genuinely democratic it
cannot come into existence solely through the state. Marxism itself suggests that the state—
largely a function of existing economic relations—cannot be socially creative in such a radical
way. Instead, there has to be a ferment of creative energy at the grassroots (as there was during
the long transition from feudalism to modern capitalism) that builds and builds over generations,
laboriously inventing new kinds of institutions in a process that is both, or alternately, obstructed
and facilitated by state policies (depending on whether reactionaries or liberals are in power, or,
eventually, leftists).
Nearly all attempts at socialist revolution so far have been directed at a statist rupture with the
past, and have therefore failed.i There is no such thing as a genuine “rupture” in history: if you
attempt it, you’ll find that you’re merely reproducing the old authoritarianism, the old
hierarchies, the old bureaucratic inefficiencies and injustices, though in new forms.ii Rather, the
final, culminating stage of the conquest of the state has to take place after a long period of
economic gestation, so to speak (again, gestation that has been facilitated by incremental changes
in state policies, as during the feudalism-to-capitalism transition), a gestation that serves as the
material foundation for the final casting off of capitalist residues in the (by then) alreadypartially-transformed state.
10
This brings us back to the question of how capitalist elites will deal with the popular discontent
that is certain to accumulate globally in the coming decades. Since the political economy that
produced social democracy is passing from the scene, other sorts of concessions (in addition to
repression) will be necessary. In our time of political reaction it is, admittedly, not very easy to
imagine what these might be. But we can guess that, as national governments prove increasingly
unable to cope with environmental and social crises, they will permit or even encourage the
creation of new institutional forms at local, regional, and eventually national levels. Many of
these institutions, such as cooperatives of every type (producer, consumer, housing, banking,
etc.), will fall under the category of the solidarity economy, which is committed to the kind of
mutual aid that has already been rather prominent in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Capitalism’s loss of legitimacy will foster the conditions in which people seek more power in
their workplaces, in many cases likely taking them over, aided by changes in state policies (such
as the active promotion of a cooperative sector to provide employment in a stagnant economy)
due in part to the presence of more socialists in government. Other innovations may include a
proliferation of public banks, municipal enterprises (again, in part, to provide jobs at a time of
raging structural and cyclical unemployment), and even universal basic income.
The subject of what types of “non-reformist reforms”—i.e., reforms that have the potential to
serve as stepping-stones to a new economy—governments will be compelled, on pain of
complete social collapse, to grant is much too complex to be explored in a brief article. Two
points suffice here. First, the usual Marxist critiques of (worker) cooperatives and other
ostensibly apolitical, interstitial “anti-capitalist” institutions—such as “mutual aid”—can be
answered simply by countering that these are only one part of a very long and multidimensional

project that takes place on explicitly political planes too. It is puzzling that so many radicals
seem unaware that the transition to a new civilization is an incredibly complex, drawn-out
process: for instance, over many generations, emergent institutions like cooperatives network
with each other, support each other, accumulate and share resources in an attempt to become
ever freer of the competitive, sociopathic logic of the capitalist economy. At the same time, all
this grassroots or semi-grassroots activity contributes to building up a counter-hegemony, an
anti-capitalist ethos in much of the population. And the resources that are accumulated through
cooperative economic activity can be used to help fund political movements whose goal is to
further transform the capitalist state and democratize the economy.
Second, the question naturally arises as to why the ruling class will tolerate, or at times even
encourage, all this grassroots and statist “experimentation” with non-capitalist institutions. On
one level, the answer is just that the history will unfold rather slowly (as history always does—a
lesson too often forgotten by revolutionaries), such that at any given time it won’t appear as if
some little policy here or there poses an existential threat to capitalism. It will seem that all that
is being done is to try to stabilize society and defuse mass discontent by piecemeal reforms
(often merely local or regional). Meanwhile, the severity of the worldwide crises—including,
inevitably, economic depression, which destroys colossal amounts of wealth and thins the ranks
of the obstinate elite—will weaken some of the resistance of the business class to even the more
far-reaching policy changes. By the time it becomes clear that capitalism is really on the ropes, it
will be too late: too many changes will already have occurred, across the world. Historical time
cannot be rewound. The momentum of the global social revolution will, by that point, be
unstoppable, not least because only non-capitalist (anti-privatizing, etc.) policies will have any
success at addressing ecological and social disaster.
11
The argument that has been sketched here has a couple of implications and a single major
presupposition. The presupposition is that civilization will not destroy itself before the historical
logic of this long social revolution has had time to unfold. There is no question that the world is
in for an extraordinary era of climatic chaos, but—if for a moment we can indulge in optimism—
it might transpire that the ecological changes serve to accelerate the necessary reforms by
stimulating protest on an absolutely overwhelming scale. Maybe, then, humanity would save
itself in the very nick of time. If not, well, we’ll have a grim answer to the old question
“Socialism or barbarism?”
One implication of the argument is that there is a kernel of truth in most ideological tendencies
on the left, and radicals should therefore temper their squabbling. The old debates between, say,
Marxists and anarchists are seen to be narrow, short-sighted, crabbed, doctrinaire, and premised
on a false understanding of the timescales in question. If one expects revolution to happen over a
couple of decades, then yes, the old sectarian disputes might acquire urgency and make some
sense. But if one chooses to be a Marxist rather than a voluntarist, a realist rather than an idealist,
one sees that global revolution will take a century or two, and there is temporal room for statist
and non-statist strategies of all kinds.
A second implication, less practically important but of interest anyway, is that Marxists going
back to the founder himself have misunderstood the prescriptions of historical materialism.

There may well be something like a “dictatorship of the proletariat” someday, but, since idealism
and voluntarism are false, it will (like the earlier “dictatorship of the bourgeoisie”) happen near
the end of the revolutionary epoch, not at the beginning. It is impossible to predict what form the
state will take by then, or how the final removal of bourgeois remnants from government will
further transform it. What can be known is only that in order to politically oust the ruling class,
the working class needs not just numbers but resources, which hitherto it has lacked on the
necessary scale. With the gradual—but, of course, contested and violent—spread of a semisocialist economy alongside (and interacting with) the decadent capitalist one, workers will be
able to accumulate the requisite resources to effectually compete against the shrinking business
class, electing left-wing representatives and progressively changing the character of the capitalist
state.
Meanwhile, in the streets, people will be figuratively manning the barricades, decade after
decade, across a world tortured by the greed of the wealthy and the suffering of the masses. All
their struggles, surely, will not be in vain.
i

Other reasons for their failure have been operative as well, notably imperialist interference with the revolutionary
process. But the effectiveness of such interference has itself shown the inadequacy of an exclusively “ruptural”
strategy—the attempt to create socialism by political fiat in a still-overwhelmingly-capitalist world—because core
capitalist nations usually find it easy to squash the political revolution when it hasn’t been preceded by generations
of socialist institution-building across the globe, including in the heart of the most advanced countries.
ii

To repeat, this is the lesson of Marxism itself. We are embedded in the past even when trying to idealistically leap
out of it and leave it behind. Insofar as Marx sometimes wrote as if a proletarian dictatorship could virtually “start
anew,” enacting whatever policies it wanted and planning a new society as though from a blueprint, he forgot the
gist of his own thought.

